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David Calleo
Europe: What Will It Become? Will It Be a Model?
In the first half of the twentieth century Europe was the world’s greatest
problem. Its grand experiment with regional integration has arguably made it
the world’s model region. Just as Europe invented the nation-state and exported
it to the rest of the world, it developed the regional, confederated model, which
retains the many advantages of nation-states—consensus, participation, commu-
nity—but mitigates traditional dangers. Can this formula be exported to other
regions?
The prospects for success elsewhere depend on what the European Union is
and what was responsible for its success. It was once widely believed that inte-
gration into the EU was a self-propelling functionalist process, where economic
integration spilled over into political integration and nation-states gradually lost
power to a federal center. A recent counterargument sees the EU as a genuinely
new political form that is rejuvenating nation-states without requiring them to
abandon sovereignty. Instead they enhance it through perpetual negotiation
with neighbors. The resulting hybrid is a confederacy with significant federal
elements. 
Inherent in this functionalist model is a tendency toward stasis. Integration
creates new opponents, which combine to stop further integration. Although
some of this happened during the Cold War, the process started up again under
such external shocks as the collapse of Bretton Woods, which led to the
European monetary union, or the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which led to
Maastricht. Looking at the EU in this broader view emphasizes the political will
exercised by such member states as France and Germany. 
The EU is not mechanical integration spilling over into the political, but a
concert of regional powers shaped by their shared, traumatic historical experi-
ence. That political will was born in two terrible wars and the resultant determi-
nation to avoid repeating them. The Cold War, with an occupied and defeated
Germany, provided the idea of European unity time for incubation. Military prob-
lems were handled by the American protectorate, leaving European states free to
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concentrate on economic development. The US was an incentive to these develop-
ments by fostering a relatively open international system. Its success depended
on a particular set of geographical, historical, and geopolitical circumstances.
Such an economic and political package is not easily exportable because
conditions for its success are not easy to replicate. We may nevertheless try to
deconstruct it into its various parts and see if they have relevance for other
regions in the world. ASEAN offers one possibility; the other is a sort of East
Asian concert, although it may not possess Europe’s potential to become an
autarchic block due to its dependence on imported capital and its vulnerability
to financial shocks caused by the dollar’s volatility. Its members do not trade
with each other, but with the US, and they maintain a global, rather than a
regional orientation. A breakdown in the global economy may give rise to a pros-
perity sphere. Who will dominate it and how it will be organized are still to be
determined, as well as the disparity between small and large countries. 
The Asian Free Trade Area, to which we can add Japan, Taiwan, and South
Korea, is trying to intensify core Asian economies, although it is unclear if we
are witnessing a coming together or a struggle for regional dominance. Another
possibility is a concert of China with its productive capacity, Russia with its raw
materials, and Japan with its capital. Could such a concert include India and
Pakistan in some kind of Asian Westphalian system? There are serious obsta-
cles. We are not dealing with a unifying regional tradition or with small, com-
pact countries, but with vast empires that have spent most of their history
isolated from each other. Another problem is American interests, which prefer
bilateral relationships they can dominate and control.
America’s policy of encouraging unipolar models can become unstable.
Should Europe consolidate, Russia revive, and China experience rapid growth,
the resulting plural world would contest American dominance. The US, inter-
ested in prolonging its leadership and managing its own decline, might grow less
confrontational and wish to appease rising Eurasians. In any case, the US will
play an important role in the future evolution of the Eurasian system, either as a
patron or an irritant creating an opposing Eurasian concert.
Session One
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4By 2015 or so, China’s GDP will be equal to America’s. Huge economic prob-
lems are developing, even if all the growth is fresh, especially if this growth
occurs at the expense of other nations and involves the environment, energy, etc.
A concert of nations could anticipate and plan for them before they get out of
control. Economic integration may not seem impossible once technology nar-
rows these distances. 
Aspects of the European experience may be relevant to Eurasia despite pow-
erful traditional cultures. A sort of consulate will be necessary, as well as perma-
nent representatives and a small technocratic commission, which would answer
to everybody. The UN could serve that function, but presently it is too vast and in
need of reform. One can imagine a world organized regionally, with the Security
Council as a summit.
S E S S I O N  O N E
Tony Smith
Response
By taking a functionalist view of economic spillover, David makes an important
contribution to our understanding how the increasingly integrated union is pro-
pelled not so much by internal dynamics as by responses to external shocks.
Globalization, going back to the ’70s, made Europe realize it needed a tightly
integrated market to be economically competitive. The second shock was the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
There have been two new shocks. The first is the growing European sense of
abandonment by the US, which, by engaging in increasingly unilateral policies,
seems to them to be more interested in Russia than in its older European part-
ners. The US once did much to foster European integration, but now seems to be
moving away from it. Europe is asking how its security and economic policies
should respond to this change. Some predict that a withdrawal of American
power will cause the EU to stutter to a stop, but there is also the possibility that
the divergence of Europe and the US will lead to a greater consolidation of the EU.
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The second new shock is the current attempt to broaden, rather than
deepen, the EU. If the EU Constitutional Convention is successfully completed
according to German ideas of European integration, broadening may give extra
weight to the European experiment. A great deal depends on the Constitutional
Convention and how various countries react to its decisions. Europe may develop
into a set of concentric circles with an integrated core and peripheral countries
acting collaboratively on issues of security and economics. The entry of the
Czech Republic and Hungary may be an easy matter, but Russia and Turkey
attempting to adopt policies consistent with European norms may be more com-
plicated. The processes of broadening and deepening may not be contradictory. 
I share David’s belief that the “constitutional software” of the European
Union is of limited relevance to other places in the world. I place great impor-
tance on democratic governments and their repertoire of institutions, values,
and practices that can be used to create confederal or federal systems.
Democracy is a kind of secular religion that allows countries with different
national identities to avoid exaggerating them and demonizing their neighbors.
If countries that want to join the EU are required to adopt features of liberal
democracies, Eurasian and Asian cases are problematic. Latin America, however,
seems promising, as the example of NAFTA shows.    
Finally, the issue of security makes Eurasia different from Europe. David’s
view of Chinese dynamism joining with Russian natural resources and Japanese
capital overlooks the fear of China’s neighbors that any collective security pact
would entail Chinese dominance. I do not see other external inducements for
developing a security pact.
Session One
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Michael Shifter
The Western Hemisphere
The Western Hemisphere as a region has its own institutions and organizations.
Various countries have their own legal systems, but the region shares a set of
values and aspirations and a commitment to democracy. The central problems it
faces—drugs, security, and trade—can be dealt with on a regional basis. If the
Organization of American States did not exist, we would need to invent a similar
political organization.
The central problem of the hemisphere is the asymmetrical power of the US.
Relations with the US have always aroused great mistrust, and the OAS has been
generally seen as an instrument of US control and domination. Recently,
impelled by demography and geography, an extraordinary advance in regional
integration and coherence has led to NAFTA and the integration of Mexico with
the US. The future of the Western Hemisphere may be reflected in NAFTA,
although some South Americans consider Mexico a traitor to the Latin American
cause.
Others hope that political and economic integration will result in greater
political solidarity with the US. The Bush administration, which at first seemed
interested in the project, since September 11 has allowed real set-backs to
develop and important historical problems to be exposed, although we should
not lose sight of the important distinction between economic and political
problems.
The other key player is Brazil, who, with the US, directs progress toward a
free trade area in the Americas. The achievement of this goal depends on the two
countries agreeing on fundamental issues. The new leftist government in Brazil
is concerned with dealing with issues of equality and poverty before it is willing
to play an effective role on the regional stage. Washington is undecided about
whether Brazil is a threat and a troublesome rival or a positive force for building
a broader, stronger, and more effective community. The future of the economies
of these countries is crucial to the future. Despite their shared aspirations, the
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situations in Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia are so serious that no solution
will be found for 10 or 15 years. 
How will the US deal with the region? It is one of the few actors with the
capacity to affect the future. The problem of US domination is not as worrisome
as that of indifference, in which Latin America is seen merely as a backyard of
the US. The drug-fueled violence of Colombia, the oil-rich political polarization
in Venezuela, or the possible financial collapse in Argentina, though compli-
cated, are manageable and can be contained. The US should be engaged more
actively in this region, but so far we have not developed broad strategies. The
US’s proper role is neither to dominate nor withdraw but to serve as a catalyst for
change. There are only a few signs that we are moving in that direction.
S E S S I O N  T W O
Robert Jackson
Response
I will not discuss American foreign policy, but reflect on the notion of the
Western Hemisphere, especially the northern part, as a region. It is quite a
strange place, resembling neither Europe, South America, nor most fragmented
regions of the world. It is a highly simplified continent, concerned primarily with
domestic politics and of very little interest internationally, dominated as it is by
Canadian-American relations. North America is America, unified in a most
remarkable way by Manifest Destiny. The rest is residual, marginal, and insignif-
icant. The question of whether the region can be unified even further raises the
issue of the US relationship to Canada.
The intimate diplomatic relations between the two is based on a cultural
similarity that makes a Canadian virtually indistinguishable from an American.
The situation may fragment and the idea of Canada itself may fail if Canada can-
not deal satisfactorily with Quebec. If Quebec becomes independent, what will
become of the rest of Canada? Will it recognize Manifest Destiny and join the
Session Two
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the Maritime provinces?
Perhaps a little radically, I see the future as fragmentation and reunifica-
tion. With the exception of Quebec, North America will become identical with the
US. Edmund Burke characterized the East India Company as “a state disguised
as merchant.” I would apply his words to the US, an empire disguised as a repub-
lic disguised as a democracy. And Canada? An international system disguised as
a federation.
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S E S S I O N  T H R E E
Ian Bremmer
Central Asia and the Former Soviet Union
The US had two overarching policies toward Eurasia in the post-Soviet period.
The first was to develop friendly relations with Yeltsin and to allow him to do
whatever he wanted internally. The second was to develop and exploit Caspian
energy resources, in particular a single-pipeline project that would bring oil and
gas from the Caspian, across Turkey, and into Europe while by-passing Russia.
The first policy failed, but the second succeeded. Because of consistently high
energy prices, Baku-Ceyhan is now beginning construction.  
US-Russian strategic relations are probably the most important in the
region and represent one of President Bush’s policy successes. Quite apart from
their value as energy sources, the Caucasus and Central Asia are important to
the US for strategic purposes and in the fight against terror. Thus the natural
resource losers of the former Soviet Union were last year’s winners, and coun-
tries that had no oil or gas got a US base. US engagement has opened a window
of opportunity for an improved economic climate. Georgia and the Kyrgyz
Republic, though by no means democratic, are some of the more reform-inclined
regimes in that region. 
2001–2002 was a banner year for Eurasia. US secretaries traveled there and
all of Europe was talking about it. I do not think this interest is sustainable, not
because this region will become less important, but because Iraq will occupy the
attention of the US, who can juggle only so many balls. We will probably forget
Afghanistan unless there is another terrorist attack. US-Russian relations,
because they are based on national interests that are as important to Putin as to
any American president, are likely to be a keeper. A great deal of intelligence and
support for the US comes from Russia and cannot be supplied by other sources.
Access to bases and coordination on other security issues will remain substan-
tial issues. A US-Russian deal on Iraq is pretty much in place. 
Energy is a primary interest in Eurasia. Siberia has overtaken the Caspian
in global energy importance. Having secured US support for security in such
places as Georgia, Russia will cooperate with the US and cement these ties. 
Session Three
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US-Iranian relations will not improve unless the Iranian regime changes.
The pro-Iran lobby pretty much dried up after the “axis of evil” speech, and the
Bush administration has not said much on the issue recently. But we may see a
great deal of stability in Iran if Hussein were removed and reformists in Iran
were able to remove conservatives from power. Although that is likely to lead to
short-term violence, it might in the long term attune Iran to global markets and
globalization. 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are likely to compete for sub-regional domi-
nance in the Caspian, although Kazakhstan is undermined by corruption and the
Giffen case. The greatest disappointment so far has been the Ukraine, which,
partly because it shipped technology to Iraq, is off the table in terms of NATO
enlargement. For many reasons, Russian-Ukrainian ties have not been consoli-
dated. While the Ukraine is retrenching its relation to Russia, economic ties will
remain extremely important. 
China will play a significant long-term role in the region because of its need
for water and energy, but I don’t see it becoming a major player in the next five
years. Japan, on the other hand, might very well sneak into the big Siberia energy
game. Keep an eye on the Koizumi-Putin summit. If the Japanese do not have a
say in Russian economic development, they may lose out to China. The pipeline
from Kazakhstan to China is on the drawing boards, but it’s a slow and expen-
sive project. The Chinese want to get in on the central Siberian fields, as do the
Japanese, an effort the US is likely to support. Oil reserves in Siberia are much
larger than in the Caspian.
S E S S I O N  T H R E E
Walter Connor
Response
Although Russia is a great regional power, it is not clear what its future or its
orientation toward Europe and Asia will be. Right now its tough, hands-on presi-
dent seems willing to make difficult decisions. Its balance sheet is currently
looking pretty good, and our alliance with them seems to be holding up. There
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are still some scary things which we should look at, especially in light of 1989
and 1991 when the wheels came flying off.
The first problem is the fragility of the Russian population. It is hard to
think of a country on the upswing with Russia’s declining population. Too many
people are dying prematurely and not enough people are being born. Some sort
of existential doubt about the future is afflicting those who must produce the
next labor force and the military. The second problem is health. The country sim-
ply isn’t ready for the impact of HIV. Given the fertility situation and a health
reversal that has hit people in their middle and productive years, a dramatic
impact will be followed by unforeseeable social ripples.
Although Ian has made much of how much Siberian oil there is, the country
still depends, apart from weaponry, on an export mix that consists of low-value-
added merchandise. Russia is still a taker, not a maker of price, and is dependent
on price fluctuations in the world market. They have not managed to diversify
significantly, but were carried in an otherwise stagnant market by high oil
prices. In terms of its relation to Eurasian business, Russia could be a wreck
since its regional power is conditioned by the scale and power of its Eurasian
neighbors. The Ukraine is not likely to do much better and Belarus and Moldova
are pretty atrocious.
That brings me to the issue of what kind of regional power would Russia
choose to be. Since it is locked out of successful, institutional Europe, it may
have to choose to define itself as Eurasian. But it may not have the resources to
make that kind of choice.  In Prague and other places, boundaries have closed
and gates have dropped over a newly defined Europe, while most post-Soviet
states remain locked out on the other side. 
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, all countries that mix
Protestantism and Catholicism, have been admitted despite squawking from
Russia. The second phase of NATO expansion, which may bring in other parts of
eastern Europe, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—and perhaps also Romania and
Bulgaria—does not include accepting Russia as a member. The first wave of
expansion surprised almost no one, involving as it did states that were so com-
pact. The new wave will reaffirm the boundary around the old Roman Empire
Session Three
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and emphasize traditional markers. Russia is still out of the range of possibility,
even in terms of trade with the EU, which is still quite marginal. 
A big gap exists between Europe and Eurasia. Most Europeans see Russia as
Asiatic, and it is not surprising that Christianity is being cited as a reason for
excluding Turkey from Europe. The new happy Europe of the EU is pretty much
post-Christian, though its churches remain empty, and post-Western-
Christianity leaves people with a different mindset than Orthodox Christianity
or Islam. Those tensions are likely to remain. 
Baltic and ex-satellite countries, having escaped the taint of being consid-
ered Eurasian, have been folded successfully into the new Europe. It is rather iffy
whether Romania and Bulgaria can also cross the line. That would also mean the
exclusion of the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and, of course, Russia, who could all
consolidate in a region we might call Eurasia. That situation might last a long
time. Who could undertake a broadening of their institutions? Thousands of
Belarussians, Ukrainians, and even Russians who show quite a good work ethic
will cross the eastern Polish border every day. If the Poles get edgy, Brussels will
squeeze them into behaving like good Europeans.
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S E S S I O N  F O U R
Maya Chadda
Asia: Will It Be the Power Center of the Future?
Asia is so vast and diverse and contains so many civilizations—many of them on
various trajectories of development—that we will by-pass the problem of defining
Asia. If not, we will spend the entire session on preliminary questions. The con-
cept of Asia is a Western idea. Asians do not think of themselves as Asians, but
in terms of nationality, ethnicity, religion, region, etc. I approached the question
by focusing on regions, clusters of states that share history, geography, cultural
overlap, and the potential for economic interdependence. Three countries will
give us some sense of what will happen in Asia: India and South Asia, China and
East Asia, and Indonesia and Southeast Asia.  
Each emerged as an important power in its own region in the context of
ongoing debates about each country. For example, is India a hegemonic power, or
one that pursues a defensive dominance? Will China, historically an aggressive,
lordlike expansionist state, pursue a muscular, robust policy, or will it be prima-
rily defensive? The debate about China focuses on the acquisition of weapons
and the modernization of its armed forces. Whether this is an offensive or defen-
sive posture is a question of relativity. China may be modernizing itself because
it perceives itself as weak in comparison to other countries.
We also wonder how Chinese domestic issues interconnect with foreign pol-
icy ambitions. If, as some maintain, China’s government is well established and
will not destabilize, we can expect China to continue moving in its present direc-
tion. I have some doubts. Factors that led to Tiananmen Square are still operat-
ing, including a divided political class. Growth in China is reaching the rate of 6
or 7 percent. In 40 or 50 years its GNP will equal that of the US. Three scenarios
are possible: stability and growth; fast growth, requiring basic structural
reforms that would certainly destabilize the country; and a balance between
unleashing forces of growth and keeping a lid on and managing it.
Whether China is an aggressive power depends on the expansion of Chinese
military power and the military and economic expansion of other Asian coun-
tries. Military expenditures in other Southeast Asian countries have grown enor-
Session Four
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mously as a function of their expanded economies. India has acquired nuclear
weapons, not to match China, but to keep her at bay. In other words, China faces
limitations based on relative shifts in the balance of Asian power and problems
of managing future internal instability.
Economic reforms in India have created a different kind of system. The days
of the Congress Party are gone, having been replaced by coalition government. A
strong center with weak regions has given way to strong regions with a weaker
center, thus creating problems for political stability in China. The Indian system
is pretty sound and stable. They have expanded the economy and managed the
electorate while remaining a democracy. The core objective for both is national,
territorial, and political consolidation.  
That same is true for Indonesia, which has slid from being an economic mir-
acle to chaos, instability, and turmoil. It is difficult to predicts its future, but it
could potentially be an important power in Southeast Asia. It is promoting
regional integration as a way of protecting itself and keeping China and the US
at bay. 
Asia will remain a region with several centers of power. Dominant states will
avoid war in order to pursue objectives of consolidation. The US and China are
likely to build selectively cooperative relations, and China is not likely to chal-
lenge the US presence in Asia. India, too, will accommodate the US presence,
which is a new development. The Afghan war and the US returning to Asia pre-
sent a new context. In the past India has tried to maintain maximum autonomy
for itself by keeping superpowers out of South Asia. India is using the US to con-
tain Pakistan so that it does not have to go to war itself. 
Prospects of regional integration as we find them in Europe are dim to non-
existent. Given the diversity of styles and relative importance of each country,
Asian international relations are hierarchical. History has cheated them by leav-
ing nation-state consolidation incomplete, just as these countries are emerging
as powerful and confident. They must now redefine the power of the state
between the public and private, despite their national quests having been built
on the idea of sovereign, hard nation-states. Only constituencies for regional
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integration are growing in Asia. Those wedded to the notion of nation-state are
infinitely stronger.
S E S S I O N  F O U R
Constantine Menges
Response
I have a different view of China. Any kind of regional integration in Asia is likely
to be a pax sinica, which in three steps will develop from Chinese dominance in
East Asia, to all of Asia, and finally Eurasia. That is the Warsaw Pact model, but
it is worth thinking about China in different terms. 
I am concerned about China for several reasons. The tragedy of the post-
Tiananmen period was the refusal of the Communist Party to permit political
liberalization. I believe Li Peng goaded the whole process, including the demon-
stration itself, in order to bring about a forceful crackdown and stop political lib-
eralization cold in its tracks. There will be no political liberalization while they
are opening up the economy, have international relations, and pursue economic
expansion and the four modernizations—industry, science, technology, and
military.
American policy, including Bush’s secret mission of Scowcroft and
Eagleberger, has been to allow Chinese domestic repression of civil rights as the
price for increased trade. American presidents of both parties have been assur-
ing us that political liberalization will happen some day. Despite the faith of
leaders of both parties in Congress, we’ve been waiting 30 years, and it hasn’t
happened yet. 
From 1990 to 2000, the Chinese enjoyed a one-way access opportunity with
the markets of major industrial democracies, while keeping their market mostly
closed. Devaluation in 1994 and coerced, unfree labor have been very advanta-
geous to US corporations. The Chinese trade surplus in that period amounted to
$720 billion, in addition to more than $500 billion in commitments for foreign
direct investment and a $75 billion commitment from the World Bank and Asian
Session Four
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Development Bank. That comes to $1.2 trillion that Communist China has
received from the major democracies. 
China claims we are its major trading partner. But we are also its prime
enemy. The disparity between their claims and the truth of the situation matches
the Third Reich buildup, when England year after year believed its special trade
status with Hitler would soften his heart. The Chinese strategy is different, of
course. China has used military force suddenly and aggressively on three occa-
sions, and for four decades has supported armed insurgency. It asserts territorial
claims with 11 of 14 neighboring countries and harasses aircraft and ships. It
claims the entire South China Sea, the international waterway for world trade
and Japan’s lifeline. It is engaging in a significant military buildup, which
includes information warfare. It has been a major proliferator of weapons of
mass destruction and advanced technology. It has conducted large-scale
espionage.
The most important reason to be concerned, however, is China’s strategy of
stealth-dominance. No one is looking at what China is doing. I expose it in my
forthcoming book, 2007: The Preventable War—The Strategic Challenge of China
and Russia. Our own government is divided by regions, but China is pursuing a
worldwide strategy, including in Latin America. China may attempt to take con-
trol of Taiwan, neutralize Japan and South Korea, and even threaten to destroy
American cities if the US dares to defend Taiwan. East Asian dominance would
follow and then Eurasia.
An official white paper of the People’s Republic of China claims no state
should have a security alliance with the US. It directs Japan to get out of its
alliance with the US. The Chinese wish to have the US continue to provide the
money and technology for their economic and military buildup, while they
stealthily move to dominate other countries in 25 years. I do not think the
process is inevitable, but, as Sun Tsu said, one should aim not to win battles, but
to defeat the enemy without battles.
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Ralph Buultjens
Response
Today’s papers were all characterized by an assumed optimism that the US will
remain as powerful for the next 25 years as it has been. But that may not be the
case. I agree with Professor Chadda’s choice of emphases, but my views of them
are somewhat different. 
A good deal of China’s future—as, indeed, India’s—will depend on a banking
crisis that could undo the economic gains China has recently made. It could also
be undermined by a tension that must give at some point between an increas-
ingly liberated economy and a tightly controlled polity. India’s role in the region
will depend to a large extent on the way it meets a series of challenges. India’s
stated past policy was grounded on several fundamental commitments—to
democracy, economic advancement, the secular state, and nonalignment—which
have now become subject to revision. Indonesia is much like Turkey with its
moderate Islam, the support of its army for the political system, and its problems
of fragmentation. Both nations sit aside strategic waterways and both suffer
from financial collapse and the destabilizing effects of elections. The rise of
Islamist sentiment will dwarf all other considerations for the future of
Indonesia. Since leadership is the key to the way these countries will progress in
the next few years, I wonder what kind of leadership will emerge.
I would like to suggest some alternatives to Professor Chadda’s choice of
India, Indonesia, and China as regional leaders. India’s pattern from 1950 to
1990 was not very impressive, but its development since 1990 has been. Is this
recent improvement a fluke or a fundamental change which will move the coun-
try forward? In Southeast Asia, I am more impressed by Vietnam than by
Indonesia. It has 75 million of the most purposeful people in the world, who have
been held back by a system that is beginning to change. In the next 25 years
Vietnam will overtake many Southeast Asian countries. In East Asia, we should
look carefully at Korea, which, if it unifies, will have a population of 70 million.
One part already enjoys a high level of development and major exports, which
could fuel a dynamic new center that might overtake China.
Session Four
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I also think expatriate communities will be critical to economic develop-
ment in these countries. The Indian diaspora—20 million people—produces as
much as the entire Indian economy, and a good part of it goes back to India.
Overseas Chinese amount to 55 million. Indonesia does not have that kind of
diaspora, so the prospect of a kind of pressure from outside is not likely to move
it. Part of Russia’s problem is the absence of such an expatriate community. But
Korea has one and Vietnam soon will. 
The big question remains whether we can assume the US will continue to be
the great power it is today. In the past, countries with enormous power—the
Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and British empires, and now the Soviet Union—
have gone down the chute very fast. We should hold a conference on whether the
US will be able to sustain the expectations expressed by our participants today.
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